CONTINENTAL CAN-NEW STRENGTH FOR
COMMON MARKET ANTI-TRUST

Multinational corporations take heed, for the Court of Justice
of the European Communities has decided a case which promises
to be a landmark in Common Market anti-trust law-Europemballage Corp. & Continental Can Co. Inc. v. EEC Commission.1 Although finding for Continental Can on the facts, the court broadly
interpreted the European Economic Community Treaty,2 thus giv-

ing to the Community's executive and administrative body, the
Commission, s broad but ill-defined power to oversee and perhaps
control mergers. This power is derived from Article 86 of the
Treaty which prohibits the abusive exploitation of a dominant po4
sition within the Common Market.

1. 12 Comm. Mt. L.R. 199 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Europemballage
&Continental Can v. Comm'n].
2. Treaty Instituting the European Economic Community, done at
Rome, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. f 161 et seq.
[hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty].
3. The Commission has the watchdog function of implementing and
enforcing the EEC Treaty. In structure it resembles the Federal Trade
Commission to the extent that it has both executive and quasi-judicial
powers. Thus, it may issue binding decisions which are subject to review
only by the Court of Justice, the highest tribunal in the Common Market.
See Art. 155, EEC Treaty, 298 U.N.T.S. at 71, 2 CCH Comm. MKT. REP.
4471.
4. The full text of Article 86 is:
Any improper exploitation by one or more undertakings of a
dominant position within the Common Market or within a substantial part of it shall be deemed to be incompatible with the
Common Market and shall be prohibited, in so far as trade between Member States could be affected by it.
The following practices, in particular, shall be deemed to
amount to improper exploitation:
(a) the direct or indirect imposition of any unfair purchase or
selling prices or of any other unfair trading conditions;
(b) the limitation of production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers;
(c) the application of unequal conditions to parties undertaking equivalent engagements in commercial transactions,
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage.
(d) making the conclusion of a contract subject to the acceptance by the other party to the contract of additional
obligations which by their nature or according to commercial practice have no connection with the subject of such
contract.
298 U.N.T.S. at 48-49, 1 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 1 2101.
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Whether that statute applies to bar mergers when the result
of the merger would be to substantially obstruct competition was
the core controversy in the case. The court held that any activity
of a dominant firm may be abusive when it in fact obstructs competition. In so holding, the court has given any multinational enterprise which is or contemplates doing business in the Common
Market reason to pause and consider the extent to which its conduct could be prohibited.
Articles 85 and 86 are the only anti-trust provisions in the EEC
Treaty. The former prohibits all agreements and concerted practices which are designed to restrict or distort competition within
the Common Market, or which have that effect. 5 The latter interdicts the improper exploitation by one or more enterprises of a
dominant market position. These provisions were made operational through the measures and structures of Council 6 Regulation 17.7
Because the Continental Can case was limited to construing Article 86, this inquiry will be similarly restricted. Attorneys for
multinational corporations will be concerned with three important
questions:
1. Can Article 86 be effectively enforced?
2. Since on its face, the Article applies only to firms in a dominant position, at what point in the market does a firm become
dominant?
5. The text of Article 85 is:
1. The following practices shall be prohibited as incompatible
with the Common Market: all agreements between undertakings
and all concerted practices which are liable to affect trade between Member States and which are designed to prevent, restrict
or distort competition within the Common Market or which have
this effect. [Examples omitted.]
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this
Article shall automatically be null and void.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared
unapplicable in the case of:
-any agreement or type of agreement between undertakings,
-any decision or type of decision by associations or undertakings, and
-any concerted practice or type of concerted practice
which helps to improve the production or distribution of goods
or to promote technical or economic progress, whilst allowing
consumers a fair share of the resulting profit and which does not:
(a) subject the concerns in question to any restrictions which
are not indispensable to the achievement of the above objectives;
(b) enable such concerns to eliminate competition in respect
of a substantial part of the goods concerned.
298 U.N.T.S. at 47-48, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. RiEP. ff I 2005-51.
6. The Council is the principal policy and lawmaking body of the EEC.
See Art. 145, EEC Treaty, 298 U.N.T.S. at 69, 2 CCH Comnm. MIKT. REP.
4401.
7. 13 E.E.C. J.0. 204 (1962).
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3. What type of market conduct or situation does the statute
proscribe?

This comment attempts to answer these questions.
ENFORCEABILITY OF ARTICLE 86

The .efficacy of any prohibitive legislation depends, in part, on
the nature and severity of the sanctions which it imposes. Article
3 of Regulation 17 obliges an offending firm to terminate any infringement upon Treaty Article 85 or 86. 8 No structure to enforce
the divestiture of an abusive merger is detailed, however. The
absence of such a structure has been considered by some commentators to prevent the Commission from using Article 86 to forbid
mergers.9 According to that argument, the failure of Regulation
17 to specifically provide for divestiture requires reference to the
general provisions of Treaty Article 222.10 Because that latter Article safeguards the laws of the member states regarding property
rights, unless authorized by the law of the relevant nation, no
divestiture may be had. Thus, Article 86 is viewed by some as a
paper tiger-a statute of limited enforceability.
This viewpoint does not reckon with the decision of the Court of
Justice in Establissements Consten & Grundig-Verkaufs-GrbH v.
EEC Commission." In that case the court rejected the argument
that Treaty Article 222 prevented the Commission from ordering
the cessation of a patent right infringement under Article 3 of Regulation 17. It held further that the Community's competition system does not permit the use of rights flowing from the laws of
2
member states for purposes contrary to Community cartel law.'
Although neither Grundig-Consten nor Continental Can dealt
with a divestiture order under Article 86, the holding in the former
8. 13 E.E.C. J.O. 206 (1962).

9. Biedenkopf, The Applicability of Common Market Antitrust Law to
Mergers, 2 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 75, 92-93 (1970). See
also Comment, European Economic Communities Antitrust Law: The Continental Can Decision-Forerunnerof a New EuropeanAnti-Merger Policy?,
47 ToL. L. REV. 829, 843 n.77 (1973).
10. Article 222 of the EEC Treaty states: "This Treaty shall in no way
prejudice existing systems and incidents of ownership." 298 U.N.T.S. at
Acquisitions and

88,2 CCH COMM. MKT.REP.

5261.

11. 2 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 18046 (1966).
12. Id. at 7654.

reveals that the court will probably have little difficulty upholding
3
a divestiture designed to further the goals of the EEC Treaty.
Having determined that Article 86 can effectively be enforced, to
what conduct does it apply? A partial description by the Court of
Justice appeared in Parke-Davisand Co. v. Probel:14
For an act to be prohibited, it is thus necessary to find the existence of three elements:
[1] the existence of a dominant position,
[2] an improper exploitation of it,
[3] and the possibility that trade between member-States may
be affected by it.15
Because that case dealt primarily with an Article 85 violation, the
court did not discuss or define the term "dominant position." The
first official action based on Article 86 appears in the Commission
decision Re GEMA,' 6 wherein a number of practices were found to
be abusive of a dominant position.1 7 Finally, on December 9, 1971,
the Commission decided Re Continental Can Co.,'3 the first appli-

cation of Article 86 to a merger situation. 19
FACTS OF THE CONTINENTAL CAN CASE

Continental Can Company (Continental) is an American-based
multinational corporation which primarily manufactures metal
containers, other packaging materials, and machines for the manufacture of such containers. 20 In February 1969, Continental ac13. See Conclusions of Advocate-General Karl Roemer, Id. at 7669. Regarding the pre-eminence of Community law, see also COSTA v. Ente

Nazionale Per L'Energia Elettrica, 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 425, 455-56 (1964).
14. 7 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 47 (1968).
15. Id. at 59.
16. 10 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D35 (1971).
17. These practices included: (1) discriminating against citizens of other
member-States; (2) imposing unneeded obligations on its members; (3)
preventing the establishment of a single market in the supply of publishing services; (4) extending copyright protection to non-copyright works;
(5) discriminating against independent importers. Id. at D58-D59.
18. 2 CCH Comm. MxT. RzP. f 9481 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Commission Decision].

19. There are two subsequent Commission decisions applying Article 86
to non-merger situations. In Laboratorio Chimico Farmaceutico Giorgio
Zoja SpA v. Commercial Solvents Corp. & Instituto Chemioterapico Italiano, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D50 (1973), appeal docketed, 16 E.E.C. J.O.
C36/5, the Commission decided that a monopolist supplier of a raw material violates Article 86 when, for the purpose of eliminating competition, it
ceases to supply that material to one of its principal users. The other decision, Re the European Sugar Cartel, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D65 (1973), held
that an oligopoly violates Article 86 when it displays abusive uniform market conduct.
20. Commission Decision, 2 CCH Comm. MAT. RE. 1 9481 at 9022-23.
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quired the majority of the outstanding shares in Schmalbach-Lubeca-Werke AG (Schmalbach), a German manufacturer of light
metal containers, other containers, and sealing machines. 21 By
the end of 1969, Continental held 85.8 per cent of its subsidiary's
22
shares.
Desiring to increase its European holdings, Continental planned
to merge with its Dutch licensee, Thomassen & Drijver-Verblijfa
N.V. (Thomassen), also a manufacturer of metal containers and
other packaging.2 To effect the merger, the parties agreed in February, 1970, that Continental would transfer its shares in Schmalbach to a holding company which would then offer to acquire the
shares of Thomassen. For its part, Thomassen's management
agreed to recommend to its stockholders that they accept the offer.2 4 Thus, on February 20, 1970, Continental established the Eu-

ropemballage Corporation (Europemballage), incorporated in Delaware as its wholly owned subsidiary to which all of Continental's
25
interests in Europe (including Schmalbach) were transferred.
In March, Europemballage offered to purchase Thomassen. This
offer was accepted and in April, Europemballage acquired 91.07
per cent of the outstanding shares in Thomassen. 26

The Commission perceived a possible violation of Article 86 of
the Rome Treaty and the next day initiated an intra-Commission
proceeding against Europemballage and Continental Can. These
proceedings culminated in a finding that Continental, through its
subsidiary Schmalbach, had a dominant position in the German
market of metal containers used for meat and fish products and for
netal caps used for jars, which market is a "substantial part" of
the Common Market within the meaning of Article 86. The Commission went on to find that the merger eliminated, as a practical
matter, potential competition in the foregoing markets. This was
held to constitute an abuse of a dominant position, which affected
trade between member states of the Common Market. On this
basis, then, the Commission held that under Article 3 of Regula21. Id.

22. Id. at 9021.
23. Id. at 9023.
24. Europemballage & Continental Can v. Comm'n, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
at 203.
25. Id.
26. Commission Decision, 2 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. f 9481 at 9022.

tion 17, Continental was obliged to terminate its infringement of
Article 86 and to submit a proposal for so terminating to the Com7
mission.2
Europemballage and Continental appealed the decision to the
Court of Justice assigning numerous points of error. These may
be loosely broken into categories of procedure and substance. That
the procedural questions were merely minor skirmishes is revealed by the summary manner in which the court disposed of
them. 28 The true controversy in the case concerned the substantive objections. Broadly put, they are: (1) whether Article 86 applies when an enterprise in a dominant position strengthens that
position by merger, to the substantial detriment of competition in
the market; (2) if so, whether the facts in this case constitute a
violation of the statute.
On its face, Article 86 is mute regarding the first question (i.e.
applicability at all), and since a resolution of the controversy may
be achieved only through interpretation, statutory construction became a central and hotly contested point. To facilitate understanding, the interpretations of each party are briefly summarized. Continental Can urged a narrow, literal interpretation of Article 86.29
Its position consisted of seven points:
1. The very wording of the statute, especially when compared

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) Treaty,
reveals a legislative intention that Article 86 not apply to bar
mergers.
Because Article 86 does not prohibit the existence of a dominant position, but only the abusive exploitation thereof, even
a monopoly is permitted and legalized.
A mere increase in market share is permissible.
Reference to general provisions of EEC Treaty is impermissible.
A broad interpretation would leave Article 86 meaningless,
since any type of conduct could be abusive.
A causal relationship must exist between the market dominance and the abusive exploitation thereof.
The appropriate policy consideration is to enable Community enterprises to compete with those from third states.

27. Id. at 9033.
28. As procedural error were cited objections to jurisdiction, notification of the matters in the complaint, discrepancy in the appellation of the
defendant, deficiency of process, and inappropriate designation of the official language. See Europemballage & Continental Can v. Comm'n, 12
Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 219-22.
29. Extracted and compiled from Pleadings by Appellant, Europemballage & Continental Can v. Comm'n, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 199 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Continental's Pleadings].

[VOL. 11: 227, 1973)

Comments
SAW DIEGO LAW

EVIEW

Urging a broad interpretation of the statute, the Commission rejoinder is as follows: 3 0
1. The basic aims of Treaty are to ensure competition.
2. Article 86(b) together with Article 3(f) constitute a broad
mandate to prohibit the effect of prejudice to consumers.
3. A change in structure of competition which reduces the consumer's market alternatives is an effect which is prohibited
as prejudicial.

4. Because it is the effect of reducing competition that is abusive, neither the type of conduct nor the existence of a causal
relationship between the dominance and that conduct is relevant to proving an abuse.

Interpretation of Article 86: The Opposing Views Discussed
Because it embodies all the significant points of the strict construction of Article 86, Continental's argument is particularly cogent. Had it been accepted by the court, Article 86 simply would
not bar mergers. American multinationals could then have freely
pursued European acquisitions, at least so long as they did not
actually coerce a merger.
1Continental opened its case by attempting to prove that the
drafters of the EEC Treaty did not intend the Treaty to apply to
mergers. Continental pointed out that nothing in the text prohibits acquisitions or other combinations. Noting that examples frequently reveal legislative intent, the multinational's attorneys
found no bar to mergers from the list of abuses following the text.
Those examples, which basically prohibit unfair pricing, blacklisting, and commercial blackmail, appear to refer only to conduct in
the market. Since a merger is merely a change in the internal
structure of a corporation, an intention to control mergers cannot
31
logically be inferred from the statute.
Furthermore, argued Continental, comparison with the very detailed anti-concentration measures found in Article 66 of the
ECSC32 Treaty further evidences the legislators' intent not to re30. Compiled from Europemballage Corp. & Continental Can Co. Inc.
v. EEC Comm'n, 2 CCH Comn. MKT. REP. 8171 (1973) at 8283-97.
31. Continental's Pleadings, supra note 29 at 2-3.

32. The European Coal and Steel Community was instituted in 1951 to
establish a common market in coal and steel commodities, and to suppress duties and prevent cartels and concentrations in those commodity
markets.

strict mergers.38 Because the EEC Treaty does not grant to the
Commission the power to forbid mergers, and because the ECSC
provisions were well known to the drafters of the EEC document,
the logical conclusion of this argument is that the form and content of Article 86 reflect a deliberate and conscious choice not to
prohibit combinations."
Continental additionally asserted that Article 86 prohibits only
the abuse of a dominant position; hence, dominance itself is implicitly permitted. Moreover, since the statute does not distinguish
between degrees of dominance, even a monopoly is permitted and
legalized. It follows, concluded Continental, that a mere merger,
the only effect of which is to increase the firm's market share
(i.e. its dominance) cannot be abusive. 35 Since Advocate-General 6 Karl Roemer concurred with Continental, 37 none of the foregoing contentions may be lightly dismissed.
The Commission responded by relying on the principles and objectives of the EEC Treaty. In particular, it cited Article 3(f)
which announces as a fundamental purpose "the institution of a
system ensuring that competition in the Common Market is not
33. Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty provides in part:
1. (A]ny transaction which would have in itself the direct or

indirect effect of bringing about a concentration .. .shall be
submitted to a prior authorization of the High Authority ....
2. The High Authority shall grant the authorization... if it finds
that the transaction ...will not give ...the power:
-to determine prices, to control or restrict production or
distribution, or to prevent the maintenance of effective competition in a substantial part of the market for such products;
or
-to evade the rules of competition as they result from the
execution of this Treaty, in particular by establishing an artificially privileged position involving a substantial advantage
in access to supplies or markets ....

7. [T]he High Authority is empowered to address to public or
private enterprises which, in law or in fact, have or acquire on
the market ... a dominant position which protects them from
effective competition in a substantial part of the common market any recommendations required to prevent the use of such
position for purposes contrary to those of this Treaty ....
Treaty Instituting the European Coal and Steel Community, done at Paris,
Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140, 199-205 [hereinafter cited as ECSC Treaty].
34. Continental's Pleadings, supra note 29, at 5.
35. Id. at 6-9.
36. Under Article 166 of the EEC Treaty, the Advocate-General is appointed by the Court of Justice for the purpose of making impartial conclusionary summaries which take the form of recommendations to assist
the court in interpreting and applying the Treaty. See 298 U.N.T.S. at 74,
2 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. ff 4607.
37. Europemballage & Continental Can v. EEC Comm'n, 12 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. at 205-09.
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distorted." 38 It reasoned that since a merger reduces the number
of competitors in the supply market, the acquisition of a competitor by an enterprise in a dominant position is a prejudicial limitation of a market and is thus prohibited. 39
Continental asserted that such general reference to the goals of
the Community is impermissible, noting that Article 3 is not law,
but merely a program provision. Implying that the specific controls the general, the corporation challenged the Commission's reliance on Article 3 by noting that Article 85(3) exempts certain
agreements from the general prohibitions of Article 85 (a),40 thus
specifically permitting and condoning restraints. 4 1 Furthermore,
because Article 86 contains no similar provision for exempting beneficial practices, a broad interpretation would render the latter
statute meaningless. That is, assuming a particular merger may
be beneficial to all concerned, including consumers, it would still
be prohibited if a mere increase in market share is per se abusive.
The absence of a provision for legalization in such a situation sugnarrowly construed to apply only to
gests that Article 86 must be
42
truly abusive combinations.
A broad interpretation would have the undesirable consequence
of removing all limits on Article 86. In urging this view, Continental argued that if increased market share is itself abusive, then
any action which leads to such an increase is potentially within the
resulting uncertainty in the law deambit of the statute. The 43
mands a strict interpretation.
Continental's last two pleadings were more technical than interpretive, in the sense of applying law to fact. The corporation's attorneys urged that there must exist a causal relationship in which
the dominant position be the means by which the combination was
effected. 44 Adoption by the court of this view would mean victory
for Continental, since the Commission never alleged that Conti38.
39.
REP.
40.
41.

298 U.N.T.S. at 16, 1 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. f 171.
Europemballage & Continental Can v. Comm'n, 2 CCH Co~imn. MET.
8171, at 8287-88.
For text of Article 85, see note 5, supra.
Continental's Pleadings, supra note 29, at 10-11.

42. Id. at 11-12.

43. Id. at 15-16.
44. Id. at 2a.

nental used its market strength to force the merger with Thom45
assenL
Finally, Continental summoned the policy consideration of enabling Community enterprises to combine for the purpose of enabling them to better compete vis-A-vis the rest of the world. In
light of stiff competition from the Metal Box Company, Ltd. of
Britain and American Can Co., Continental found the merger necessary and consistent with this policy.46
The Commission found that no causal relationship need exist
before the statute could be invoked. Although the use of the position as an instrument is relevant in examples (a), (c), and (d)
of Article 86, even internal operations are prohibited under example (b) 47 when the result is prejudicial to the consumer. As the
law interdicts end results, not means, whenever the market structure is changed in the direction of reducing competition, the resulting constriction of consumer choice is a violation of Article 86(b).-48
At this point, reference to the opinion of Advocate-General Roemer is appropriate. Concluding that the Commission decision
must be annulled as being without basis in Article 86, he embraced
strongly almost every point in Continental's argument. 49 Roemer
pointed out that a broad interpretation obstructs the basic requirement of certainty in the law. That is, the test under the narrow
view of direct prejudice to consumers is more precise than mere
impairment of choice which may lead to prejudice.50 In sum, the
Advocate-General's recommendation was a ringing endorsement
of Continental's strict interpretation.
INTERPRETATION BY THE COURT

The court posed the initial question to be whether Article 86 applies only to behavior which has a direct detrimental effect on the
market, hence consumers, or whether it also covers changes in a
corporation's internal structure which lead to serious impairment
of competition in the Common Market. 51 Internal changes, such
as mergers, increase the size and economic power of a firm; hence
45. Europemballage & Continental Can v. Comm'n, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
at 206.
46. Continental's Pleadings, supranote 29, at 17-18.
47. For text of Article 86, see note 4, supra.

48. Europemballage & Continental Can v. Comm'n, 2 CCH Comnr. MKT.

REP. f[ 8171, at 8289.
49. Europemballage & Continental Can v. Comm'n, 12 Comm.
L.R. at 205-08.
50. Id. at 207-08.
51. Id. at 223.

Mkt.
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the court could find no basis for distinguishing them from overt
practices on the market. 52 Thus, the door was opened; if Article
86 protected competition at all, it would have to apply to structural alterations such as mergers.
In determining that the statute shelters competition, the Court
of Justice emphatically rejected the contentions of both Continental and the court's own Advocate-General. Invoking the spirit
and objectives of the EEC Treaty, the court stated with unusually
strong language:
By providing for the establishment of a system that will protect
competition within the Common Market from distortion, Article
3(f) demands a fortiori that competition must not be eliminated.
This requirement is so essential that if53it did not exist numerous
provisions of the Treaty would be futile.
(emphasis added)
Thus the court easily disposed of the argument that reference to

the goals of the Community is impermissible and that comparison
to the ECSC Treaty must be made.
The court proceeded to read Articles 85-90 as a unit to achieve
the principles of Article 3, stating that Article 86 is to prevent enterprises from achieving through merger what they could not accomplish under Article 85 (i.e. by way of cartel). In short, the court
held that the purpose of the Treaty is to ensure that competition
not be distorted and that neither Article 85 nor 86 may be interpreted to contradict either each other or those basic principles
which they serve. 54
Finding, then, that the meaning of Article 86 is to promote competition, the court held:
There may therefore be abusive behaviour if an undertaking in a

dominant position strengthens that dominant position so that the

degree of control achieved substantially obstructs competition, i.e.
so that the only undertakings left in the market are those which
are dependent on the dominant undertaking with regard to their
market behaviour...
[T]he undertaking may be abusive and
prohibited by Article 86 of the Treaty, regardless of the means or
the methods whereby it has been achieved, if it has the effects
described above.5 5 (emphasis added)

In dicta, the court continued:
52.
53.
54.
55,

Id.
Id.
Id. at 224.
Id. at 225,

In fact, apart from any fault, it may be regarded as abusive if
an undertaking has such a dominant position that the objectives of
the Treaty are frustrated by a substantial change in the supply
structure seriously jeopardising the consumer's freedom of action
in the market; this is necessarily the case if competition is almost
eliminated. Although such a restrictive condition as the elimination of all (emphasis original) competition need not be fulfilled in
all cases, if the Commission bases its decision on such an elimination of competition it must give reasons that are sufficient in law
to justify it or at least must prove that competition was so substantially impaired that the remaining competitors could not con56
(emphasis added)
stitute an adequate counterweight.
Notable is the word "may" in the holding for it indicates that the
court is not formulating a per se rule, but will investigate the facts
and circumstances of each case to determine whether the obstruction of competition is an abuse.
"DoMnTANT PosITION" NOT DEFINED BY THE COURT
It is especially important that neither the concept of dominant
position nor substantial obstruction of competition are adequately
defined by the court. Since these terms are not self-defining, much
uncertainty and conflict will persist until either the court or the
Commission clarifies them.
An attempt to define dominant position appeared in the Commission decision regarding Continental Can:
Enterprises are in a dominant position when it is possible for
them to take independent lines of conduct and this enables them
to act without much regard for competitors, buyers, or suppliers.
...
This possibility does not necessarily have to result from an
absolute dominance .... 57
By these terms, a powerful, non-monopolistic market position is
correctly perceived to be dominant. The difficulty is that the Commission considers "independent" conduct to be the test. Such
market independence has usually been the classic economic description of a monopoly. 58 Thus, because the Commission's definition offers an inappropriate test, it does not adequately resolve
this semantic problem. 59
If it is assumed that dominance and competition are mutually
exclusive, when the court speaks of dominant position it really
does not mean absolute dominance but rather a strong relative
economic position which falls short of the ability to control the be56. Id.
57. Commission Decision, 2 CCH Commvn. MEKT. REP. 9481 at 9029.
58. T. MORGAN, INTR ODUCTION TO EcoNoiVrcs 182 (2d ed. 1956).
59. Nevertheless, the Commission continues to use this definition. See
Re the European Sugar Cartel, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D65, D105 (1973).
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havior of other firms on the market (i.e. the presence of a competitive counterweight). Comparison to the ECSC Treaty 60 and to
the German Law Against Restraint of Competition 6 ' supports this
analysis.
In addition, it must be emphasized that Article 86, by its own
terms, applies to an oligopoly as well as to a single firm. 62 This fact
has been underscored in the Commission decision Re the European
Sugar Cartel.63 In that proceeding the Commission held that two
corporations which display almost identical market behavior will
be treated as a single unit. The size and market conduct of that
unit will then be considered in determining whether the unit has
a dominant position.64
Because the Court of Justice declined to discuss what is meant
by "dominant position," no truly definitive statement can be made.
However, to be safe, the American multinational corporation
should concern itself with Article 86 when either (1) by itself or
through subsidiaries6 5 or (2) by participation in an oligopolistic
structure it achieves a very strong position in a market which is
nonetheless still competitive (i.e. wherein no individual firm is
able to control the market behavior of another firm).
60. According to section 7 of Article 66 a firm has a dominant position
when it is free from effective competition. 261 U.N.T.S. at 203-05.
61. Section 22 of the German Law Against Restraints of Competition of
July 27, 1957 provides:

(1) Insofar as an enterprise has no competitor or is not exposed
to any substantial competition in a certain type of goods or

commercial services, it is market-dominating within the
meaning of this Law.
(2) Two or more enterprises are deemed market-dominating insofar as, in regard to a certain type of goods or commercial
services, no substantial competition exists in fact between
them in general or in specific markets, and they jointly meet
the requirements of subsection (1).
Law of July 27, 1957, [1957] BGB1. 1 1081.
62. I.e., "Any improper exploitation by one or more undertakings

...

"

(emphasis added) 298 U.N.T.S. at 48, 2 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 1 2101.
63. 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D65 (1973).
64. Id. at D104.
65. The market conduct of a subsidiary will be imputed to its parent
when that parent owns greater than fifty percent of the outstanding stock.
Apparently, direct orders from the parent to the subsidiary are not required in order for the behavior to be imputed; the mere potential for
control will suffice. Europemballage & Continental Can v. Comm'n, 12
Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 221. See also Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v.
EEC Comm'n, 11 Comm, Mkt, LR. 557, 628-29 (1972).

ANY TYPE OF CONDUCT HELD PoTENTIALLY ABusIm
It is of greatest importance to recognize that while Continental
Can deals with the applicability of Article 86 to a merger situation,

the language of the holding is not so restrictive. Because the court
prohibited any activity which substantially obstructs competition,
this is much more than an anti-merger case. The range and scope
of the type of conduct which it embraces is limitless. It is thus conceivable that the acquisition of a new patent, factory, land, etc.
may be barred.06 The only limitation on Article 86 is that the effect of the conduct must reduce competition. The extent to which
this will in fact restrict the Article will depend on to whom the
statute is addressed and how much market control is too much.
The meaning of the term "substantially obstruct competition"
will determine what is to be prohibited. Unhappily, that concept
is ambiguous because the modifying description is not precise. 67
Dependence on the dominant undertaking suggests at least three
market situations: (a) subsidiary relationship wherein the parent
owns at least 50 per cent of the capital; (b) virtual monopoly, or
(c) oligopoly. In the broader context of obstructing competition
(a) and (b) may be regarded as having the same effect because
when the situation described in (a) exists the behavior of the subsidiary will be imputed to the parent. 68 Hence both (a) and (b)
shall be treated as a monopoly situation. That the achievement
of a monopoly or near monopoly obstructs competition cannot seriously be disputed. Hence, it is at least certain that conduct which
has the effect of creating a monopoly is prohibited by the Continental Can decision.
Oligopoly restricts competition in the sense that the incentive
to compete69 and the substantive areas of competition are reduced. 70 A major characteristic of this form is mutual interdependence among the firms in the market. Interdependence could
be a reasonable interpretation of "dependence" in light of the applicability of the statute to "one or more undertakings" and the
Commission decision in Re The Sugar Cartel. Oligopoly, therefore, could properly be prohibited under Article 86. Whether the
establishment of an oligopoly is indeed proscribed will depend on
66. Conversation with Helmer R. Johnson, General Counsel for Continental Can Co., in New York City, June 21, 1973.
67. See especially the language commencing with "i.e. so that the only
undertakings .... " in the text accompanying note 55 supra.
68. See note 65 supra.
69. C.R. McCoxNELL, EcoNomcs 401 (5th ed. 1972).
70. Id. at 402.
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how widely the court will interpret "substantial obstruction," and
whether as a practical matter, oligopoly can and should be regulated.
The failure of the court to particularize the concepts "dominant
position" and "substantially obstructing competition" may well
have been more than mere oversight. By not defining the former,
the possibility arises that dominance in the form of monopoly may
itself violate Article 86. To wit, by prohibiting conduct which
obstructs competition, the court implicitly forbids monopoly
(which is, after all, the absence of competition). At the very least,
a precedent has been established upon which a future court could
rely in explicitly outlawing monopolies. Likewise, it would appear
that even oligopoly could be taboo if the remainder of the firms
in the market are dependent on that oligopoly. Because the court
has prohibited a corporation from eliminating effective competition, Article 86 has been imbued with true anti-trust capabilities.
Thus, it appears legally possible for the Commission to pursue any
permissible remedy against a firm which already has no competition. This is true cause for concern to the multinational corporation, because no new action need be taken by it; a dominant market
position itself could subject the firm to legal action. While such
an interpretation is not suggested from the face of the statute, 7it1 is
certainly within the ambit of the language used by the court.
ComIV

ssION REVERSED Ow THE FACTS

Although the court accepted the Commission's interpretation of
Article 86, it accepted Continental's version of the underlying facts.
Basically the Commission failed to carry its burden of proof.7 2 An

evaluation of the correctness of the court's decision on the facts
is beyond the scope of this inquiry. Our interest is in the discussion of the relevant market.
The Commission found that Schmalbach had between 70 to 80
per cent of the German market in cans for meat products, 80 to 90
per cent in cans for fish products, and 50 to 55 per cent7 3in metal
Conticlosures (jar and bottle caps) other than crown corks.
71.

See text accompanying note 56 supra.

72. That the Commission has the burden of proof may reasonably be
inferred from the text to which note 56 refers.
73. Commission Decision, 2 CCH Com. MrT. REP.%9481 at 9029-30.

nental urged that the Commission ignored the proper market,
which market included direct competition from other manufacturers, self-manufacture of cans by present customers, and com74
petition from substitute containers and preserving methods.
When this larger market is considered, argued the corporation,
Continental does not have a dominant position.
The court found that the Commission had indeed chosen the
wrong market. In framing the issue, it said:
In considering the dominant position of Schmalbach Lubeca-Werke
and the consequences of the merger in question, the delimination
of the market concerned is of crucial importance, for the possibilities of competition can only be considered in the light of the
characteristics of the products in question, which reveal them to

be particularly suited to satisfying a constant demand
7 5 and interchangeable with other products only to a small extent.
The court went on to find that because other competitors in the
light metal containers industry could readily produce fish and meat
cans, a serious counterweight existed. More importantly, the court
demonstrated that the outer boundary of the relevant product market is the point at which the product in question is no longer interchangeable with other products for satisfying the same purpose.
Although pleased with the court's interpretation of Article 86,
the Commission was less enthusiastic about this description of
the relevant market. In fact, the Commission found those requirements so exacting that it believed Article 86 would have only limited application in the future.7 6 At the same time, it reiterated its
77
intention to establish a system of prior control over mergers.
Another criticism of the court's view is that the test of product
78
interchangeability and cross-elasticity of demand is too broad.
The test must encompass practical indicia such as public recognition of a viable submarket or the product's peculiar characteristics
79
if it is to reach mergers between firms of a smaller scale.
It must be remembered, however, that EEC competition law is
evolving rapidly; Continental Can is just the first case in Common
74. Continental's Pleadings, supra note 29, at 22.
75. Europemballage & Continental Can v. Comm'n, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
a 226.
76. Europe, EEC Press Release No. 1229 (new series) 3-4 (Feb. 23, 1973).

77. Such controls are expected to be similar in form to the provisions

of Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty. That is, certain mergers would be
submitted to the Commission prior to their execution. They would be
considered authorized only if the Commission did not bar them within a
stated period of time. See Europe, EEC Press Release No. 1210 (new
series) 3-4 (Jan. 27, 1973).
78. Comment, supra note 9, at 840.
79. Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S., 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1960).
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Market history to apply Article 86 to a merger. Many commentators had thought that Article 86 did not prevent concentration per
se, but merely proscribed the wrongful use of a dominant position
to effect changes in the market.80 The court proved them wrong.
As the Common Market becomes familiar with anti-trust law, it is
reasonable to expect further refinements in the concept of relevant
market.
CONCLUSION

The holding of the Continental Can case is that an abuse of a
dominant position under Article 86(b) may well require the existence of five elements:
1. Defendant in dominant position.
Dominant position means strong relative economic position
which falls short of the ability to control the behavior of other
firms. (i.e. presence of counterweight in the market.)
2. Substantialobstruction of competition.
Meaning the creation of a monopoly or possibly an oligopoly,
depending on how one interprets this concept.
3. Within a relevant market.
Which is that market comprised of the commodities reasonably
interchangeable by consumers or users for the same purpose.
4. The use of any means or method.
No longer need the dominance itself be exploited to constitute
an abuse. The effect of obstruction itself is prohibited.
5. Possible affect on trade.
Between the member-States of the Community.
In formulating this prima facie case, it must be recalled that the
court did not define either "dominant position" or "substantial
obstruction." All that may said with confidence is that any type
of conduct may be abusive. This alone, however, makes the case
significant, because even if all mergers are eventually controlled
by a device other than Article 86, the statute, through Continental
Can will continue to forbid all other conduct which obstructs competition.
What advice, then, for the multinational corporation? Very little
it would seem. By announcing broad prohibitions in undefined
terms, the court has created more questions than answers. Because
80. See e.g., A. DERINGER, THE CompEnON LAWS or TnE EEC 165
(CCH ed. 1968); C. OBERnOarER, A. GLEISs, M. HmScH, COMMON MARKET
CARTEL LAW 118 (2d ed. 1971); Biedenkopf, supra note 9, at 90.

of the vagueness of the holding, the best advice for a firm is to
consult the Commission for its opinion prior to executing addi-

tional expansion.8 1 Beyond that, the only guidelines are economic
terms. The more closely a firm's behavior approximates monopoly, the greater its risk of violating the statute. At a lesser market position, the gray area of interpretation renders the multi-national's European venture a case of innocents abroad.
WM.

H.

HAUBERT

I

81. To this extent, the court has, through the vagueness of its language, created for the Commission an informal means of prior control
over mergers.

